The trivialization of smartphones has given rise to an architectural reconfiguration of the mobile operating system innovation process. We have also seen the recent emergence of three "open source" consortia: the Symbian and LiMo Foundations, and the Open Handset Alliance. In this exploratory paper, we analyse the coherence of these consortia using an open source framework to perform the necessary reconfiguration at both the technological and organizational level. In order to evaluate the coherence of this strategy, we analyse the ability of these consortia to produce standards. Bearing in mind the exploratory nature of this research, this allows us to demonstrate that, although these consortia exhibit original forms of "open innovation", they find it difficult to produce consortia standards by means of vertical coordination. Equally, we consider various scenarios dealing with the construction of standards, examining in particular horizontal collaboration between these consortia.
Introduction
Three consortia dedicated to the provision of "open source" mobile Operating System (OS) for smartphones emerged in 2007 and 2008: the Symbian Foundation, the Open Handset Alliance and the LiMo Foundation, representing respectively the 1st, 3rd and 6th mobile OS in market shares in 2010
1 . These consortia are particularly interesting when addressing the issue of ongoing architectural innovation (Henderson and Clark, 1990) in the mobile industry: the reconfiguration of the system linking existing digital services to fixed and mobile devices, thanks to the trivialisation of smartphones. Consequently, we analyse the coherence for these consortia of using an open source framework, in order to perform the necessary reconfiguration at both the technological and organizational level. This question involves three corpora of the existing literature. First, at the technological level, the mobile OS is a complex system: a set of components with strong interdependencies, which "constrains the adaptative potential of systems, and, thereby, the possible paths of evolution" (Frenken, 2006, p. 3) . In line with Simon (1962) , one means of reducing complexity is to hierarchically decompose complex systems into subsystems. This approach is to be found in the transversal definition of platform made by Baldwin and Woodard (2009) , which stems from a decomposition in terms of modularity (Baldwin and Clark, 2000) , with an emphasis on technological hierarchy. It should be recalled that although platform architecture is still a modular system, it is itself split into a platform as core, together with its complements, interoperability being managed by interface specifications. At the organizational level, collaboration matters for the mobile industry, because such a complex system requires the coordination of innovations from heterogeneous technological fields (Kelly, 2006; Maula et al., 2006) . According to Funk (2004, p. 202) , "the conventional view is that the design of the architecture and the alliances that firms make with others are the critical issues in platform management." So, in line with Le Masson et al. (2009, p. 290) , we consider a general framework where "a collaborative process of platform design can actually be itself a specific platform; we shall call it a 'platform for platform design'". Hence, there is a real interest in analysing these processes at the systemic level, from the very earliest stage, all the more so as the literature has only just started to address this question (Le Masson et al., 2009; Maula et al., 2006; West and Wood, 2008) . In other words, for Henderson and Clark (1990) , architectural innovation requires reorganization and the acquisition of knowledge by firms. This approach presupposes, however, that the available elements are readily divisible, which requires a greater formalisation of activities (Gallouj and Weinsten, 1997, p. 552) , the more so as the degree of product decomposability depends on the existing state of knowledge (Buenstorff, 2005) .
Second, the characteristics of consortia lead us to operate a selection in the literature dealing with the effect of open source communities on industries. The consortia -as sponsorbased, profit-motivated and involving firms -give echo to the idea of open innovation (e.g. Chesbrough, 2006) , because of their open source strategy (West and Gallagher, 2006; West and Lakhani, 2008) . Equally, we have to take into account the fact that sponsor-based communities differ from autonomous ones (West and O'Mahony, 2008) . We need, thus, a clarification of all these concepts: for Pénin (2008) encourage these sponsors to operate this transition: e.g., the market environment (West, 2003) , developers' preference (Sen et al., 2008) , users' involvement in innovation (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003) . Conversely, a transition to open source supposes an effort to redesign the product's architecture (Baldwin and Clark, 2006; MacCormack et al., 2006) .
Third, to judge the coherence of this organizational strategy, we analyse the ability of these consortia to produce standards, because they encourage the provision of complements (Gawer and Henderson, 2007) and, more generally, facilitate coordination (Simcoe, 2006) . In line with Coris (2006) , the consortia could encourage a hybrid form of standardization in which firms work collectively, rather than relying on the market to produce a de facto standardization subsequent to standards wars or, imposing a de jure standardization (upstream or downstream of the innovation diffusion) (Steinmuller, 2003) on the political and committee-based authorities. This form of standardization supposes a serious involvement of the stakeholders in the interest of the consortium. But while Bonaccorsi et al. (2006) show that free riding is not rational (even in "hybrid" source projects), Shah (2006 Shah ( , p. 1011 shows that, in these projects, "activities that permit value appropriation by the firm are sometimes detrimental to value creation within the community". So, it seems that organizational coherence -via the provision of standards -has equally to be adjusted via profit motivation.
Clearly, our work is mainly of an exploratory nature, since the organizational and technological platforms have not reached maturity. In the first part, we situate the consortia against a background of mobile OS platform competition. Then, we present an index of this openness, oriented on knowledge accessibility. To complete this conceptual framework, we analyse the standard creation issue as regards profit motivation coherence. In the second part, when we apply this framework to situating the three consortia in terms of an open innovation context, we note a relative difference among the consortia. We then show that the emergence of collective standards within the platform tends to remain uncertain, due to a divergence of concerns for knowledge sharing and a potential fragmentation for end-users. We conclude by discussing different speculative roadmaps for the emergence of collective standards among consortia.
A Conceptual Framework
The Mobile OS Market Competition Any evaluation of the former trajectories and actors of the mobile OS reveals a relative diversity which requires smartphones -and consequently, their OS -to be situated within the digital technology system. Put concretely, the mobile service (as seen by end-users) "has to match with a quintuple layer of specifications" (Feijòo et al., 2009, p. 287) : (i) the handset;
(ii) the mobile OS; (iii) the application which runs the service; (iv) the wireless technology;
and, (v) the operator's mobile system (portals, billing system …). It is all this which constitutes the specificity of mobile OS for smartphones: the OS operates the technological coordination between the hardware and software layers (as it does for computers), but it also requires competences peculiar to the mobile handset and mobile network. The sheer range of the relevant knowledge explains why one single firm is unable to manage everything, while the different types of collaboration help to juggle with the growth of specialized knowledge, the diversity of complementary knowledge and the variations in technological opportunities (Powell and Giannella, 2010, p. 580 (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002, p. 13 ). However, not all knowledge is transferable, qua information (Nelson and Winter, 1982, chapter 4); it requires a certain amount of translation via a shared codebook, as well as the skills needed to understand it. Grimaldi and Torrisi (2001, p. 1427) apply this idea to the software industry: knowledge is "articulated codified" and "unarticulated codified" when, the codebook is, respectively, transparent among epistemic communities or inside one epistemic community; and knowledge is "unarticulated uncodified" when located in individuals (leaders), organizational routines or processes. However, Brusoni et al. (2001, p. 600) versus open source strategies define the scope for digital platforms. To some extent, using legal tools to appropriate knowledge (like patent and copyright) supposes a relatively public disclosure of knowledge. For Shapiro (2000), however, this strategy encourages the emergence of a "patent thicket", increasing the probability for a new product (particularly, its complements) to infringe on multiple patents. For this researcher, the problem may be solved by collaboration, such as patent pools and cross licences. This form of collaboration, which reposes on "partial" licensing of modules from platform architecture, has major effects on competition (Bourreau et al., 2007, p. 183) . Open architecture, on the contrary, supposes that all the knowledge produced is accessible to everybody. Hence, the domain of intellectual property is a major index for judging openness (Powell and Giannella, 2010) . At the same time, its influence varies with its position in the platform architecture. For instance, openness at the platform (core) level provides a good picture of co-opetition (Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1997) : cooperation on platform standards, competition on complements.
Thirdly, knowledge has to be continuously extended by "ongoing interactions among stakeholders", via "frequent interactions and collaborations among as diverse participants as possible". In an industrial world of de-integrated firms, due to the rise of modularity in technology and in organization (Baldwin and Clark, 2000) , the concrete form of these (Shah, 2006; West and O'Mahony, 2008) . In this way, the leader's reputation is a major issue, because its unfair action may deprive the community of the collective innovation, especially if it attempts to compete commercially with the other stakeholders. Consequently, while the non-sponsored open source communities benefit from the participation of hobbyist developers, in sponsored ones, the developers are more incentive-oriented. Hence, in a "platform for platform design" perspective (Le Masson et al., 2009) , because of the volatility and heterogeneity of the interactions, we have also to examine whether the interactions are between individuals or firms; being surrounded by incentive-based employees reduces hobbyist involvement even more.
The Standards Settings as a Proxy of Organizational Coherence
At the organizational level, a first source for weakening the platform coherence is the opposing visions of its stakeholders about revenue origin: network, or services (Maitland, 2006) . For telecommunications incumbents, the whole stack of layers must be coordinated (vertical standardization) in order to provide services "Here, now": i.e., services which derive their functionalities from the network (e.g., location-based services, videophony, etc.). This vertical standardization gives the best results in terms of security, mobility and service efficiency, since the network is the source of revenue. However, for firms coming from software, Internet and media, the mobile phone is only a new box for their products. Because of the services already adopted on desktop and laptop computers, these firms favour horizontal standardization inside a technological layer, to provide their services "Anytime,
anywhere".
However, the mobile OS, compared to desktop computers, is particular, because it needs better integration with both the device and the end-user service (Funk, 2001 ) to enjoy the easiest access to the embedded mobile services (Kelly, 2006) . But neither the position of the mobile services within the digital technology system, nor the users' preferences are established. In order to manage these oppositions and uncertainties, mobile OS need the support of systems integrators, i.e. "companies that rely on wide and dispersed networks of suppliers of specialised components and capabilities, yet maintain broad and deep in-house capabilities" (Brusoni et al., 2004, p. 5) . In concrete terms, the system integrator has to manage the standards setting and selection process to provide the technical compatibility enabling interorganizational coordination (Steinmuller, 2003 (Evans et al., 2006, p. 195) . Hence, the standards architecture (for accessing the platform) is managed by a single system integrator, thanks to the trivialization of smartphones. So, new opportunities appear for firms able to encourage synergy / interoperability between the different platforms they own, particularly, between desktop and mobile devices. This means that, thanks to interoperability (Besen and Farrell, 1994) , there is a better portability of end-user contents and its ensuing bandwagon effect (resulting from the direct network externality with "desktop-installed" base), thereby attracting a vast community of developers and media / software providers. The point is to "mobilize" the installed base of end-users (ii). This idea is reinforced by the economic models underlying the provision of complementary goods (iii). For Evans et al., (2006) 
The Consortia: Open Innovation in Progress?
In order to further explore the issues shown in the first part, we need now to focus on the consortia. That is why we have collected data portraying the consortia's membership on 15th June 2010, as well as information available from consortia's websites about their strategies. These conditions refer to the organizational construction of the consortia. These concerns correspond also to the location of interactions: the three consortia combine the joint work of independent firms, but interactions appear at the individual level, too. The Symbian Foundation, which is owned by its members, is not a company, since its objective is not to produce innovation; only the members (firms or individuals, according to as well as the AOSP, only Google employees are concerned. Last, but not least, the right to distribute the platform commercially varies with each consortium. This is important, since it is this right which dictates the particular handset devices shipped by the platform. This right is restricted to Foundation members for Symbian, and to core and founder members for LiMo.
Meanwhile, the AOSP philosophy is to "welcome all uses of the Android source code, but only Android compatible devices -as defined and tested by the Android Compatibility
Program -may participate in the Android ecosystem"
13 .
An Undecided Involvement on Vertical Cooperation within Platforms
Table 5 (in Annex), which summarizes the explicit characteristics of the consortia, shows some major differences between the projects. But, in our analysis, these aspects should not minimize the importance of profit motivation. First, it seems that the (evolving) difference in openness among the projects refers to the "tension between control and openness" (West and O'Mahony, 2008, p. 155) : thanks to control, the platform sponsors "assure ongoing alignment between their investment in the community and related product goals", while with openness, they "win greater external participation and technological adoption". In fact, some components of the platforms are open source but, in every consortium, the trade-off between open and proprietary licensing is largely at the discretion of the components' contributor. For instance, the AOSP explains its license choice by the compliance with the handset manufacturers' issues: ASL 2.0 (non-copyleft) is more adopted for the commercial diffusion of the platform, particularly since the handset manufacturers do not have to ship the source code on handsets (only via Internet), nor to allow the modification and reverse engineering of their contributions. This example emphasizes the distinction between the openness of the innovation process and the openness of the end product of innovation (Simcoe, 2006) . In fact, our dataset (Table 2) shows that the OHA lacks handset manufacturer involvement at the 13 http://source.android.com/faqs.html foundation stage. Licensing flexibility demonstrates OHA's will to attract handset manufacturers, thanks to upstream knowledge disclosure and the relative freedom to share or not downstream innovation. This corresponds to the fragmentation scenario shown in the theoretical part: there is no move towards collective standardization (Coris, 2006) . This strategy is also at the expense of echoing an open source community, since such a strategy frustrates developers motivated by social benefit (Sen et al., 2008) .
Thanks to his industry overview, Yamakami (2009) gives us an interesting (sectorbased) economic explanation of firms' commitment to openness: (i) for semiconductor manufacturers, the mobile OS is a non-core part of their competence; (ii) for network operators, this enables a "discount war", a smart strategy when a market reaches maturity; and (iii) for handset manufacturers, this helps to transfer the growing production cost of software platforms, as well as giving a greater readability of platform evolution. Concretely, besides In a nutshell: the consortia leaders overtly want platform integrity by means of vertical cooperation. However: (i) the only tool to prevent fragmentation is the hierarchical selection for contribution; (ii) the legal structure authorizes free riding; (iii) sectoral concerns exhibit a preference for openness in term of "free beer" rather than "free speech". Consequently, the "platform for platform design" does not guarantee the emergence of collective standards within the platform.
Discussion: Towards Horizontal Cooperation between

Platforms?
Such a standardization dynamic may appear horizontally, via compatibility standards shared between platforms for specific layers. Beyond purely theoretical suppositions, we assume that this issue gains clarity by an analysis of multiple platform membership as a horizontal diffusion channel for the open knowledge produced within the consortia. In our first analysis, we studied the 307 members of the three consortia but, when all of these are combined, we find only 248 firms. In fact, 31 14 A standard-setting consortium of the World Wide Web. firms are members of two consortia, and 14 firms belong to all three. In a standard-setting approach, we have to outline the profile of these potential bridges. First, Table 3 and Table 4 give some statistics about this issue, and Figure 1 gives an overview via a network graph. From the consortium perspective, we see clearly that multiple memberships are frequent, particularly for core and founder members. For standard settings, this could be understood in four very different ways: (i) multiple memberships increase convergence among the mobile OS consortia, thanks to inter-consortium knowledge diffusion and imitation; (ii) members assume that the platform variety will last and, consequently, multiple membership will open multiple markets; (iii) members expect that one platform will become a leader but, as they do not know which this will be, they are involved in all consortia; and (iv) a quest for complementarities among consortia, i.e. the members operate a labour division among the consortia, each consortium developing its competences on particular technological layers. Furthermore, we can also explain a part of the multiple membership strategy by introducing the factor of switching costs. The transition from closed to open -carried out by Symbian and promoted by Android and LiMo -leads the actor to invest in new technological and organizational competences: without horizontal standards shared between consortia, it would be too expensive to be involved in every platform. This, therefore, makes it easier to participate in competing projects, which all exhibit the same characteristics of openness. From the sector perspective, if we look at the centre of Figure 1 we can see the dominance of network, handset and semiconductor sector firms. In fact, they dominate both platform leadership and multiple memberships (see Table 2 and Overall, one can question the durability of these consortia. Collaborations on mobile OS may be restricted to initiating the dynamic of co-evolution between platform adoption and the provision of related services, i.e. to solve "the chicken and egg problem". From a vertical perspective, collaboration is useful to transform the indirect network externality (the provision of valuable services) into scale economies at platform level (Varian, 2004) . Klepper (1997) defends collaboration as having a transient stage in the product life cycle: the technological stage of a sector determines its organizational structure (disintegrated or integrated). Gille "intertemporal externalities also lead to divergence between private costs and benefits and industry-wide costs and benefits". However, faced with strong uncertainty about potential success, collaboration helps to protect against potential loss (Powell and Giannella, 2010) and to add unanticipated complements.
Summary, Limitations and Future Research
In this work, we analyse the three main "open source" consortia dedicated to mobile OS. Thanks to this analysis, we find that open innovation is subject to various implementations according to its stakeholder concerns, with consortia leaders overtly trying to ensure platform integrity via vertical cooperation. However: (i) the only tool to prevent fragmentation is the hierarchical selection for contribution; (ii) the legal structure authorizes free riding; (iii) sectoral concerns exhibit a preference for openness in term of "free beer"
rather than "free speech". Consequently, the "platform for platform design" does not guarantee the emergence of collective standards within the platform. Finally, in the discussion, we analyse various scenarios concerning a transfer from vertical standardization (inside consortia) to horizontal standardization (between consortia).
Here, by focusing on the link between innovation and related organizational structure, and using the term "consortia" generically, we leave aside the diversity of interactions between the firms inside and outside the consortia. Likewise, because of the paper's exploratory nature, some facts refer to the consortia's philosophy rather than to observable acts. Consequently, there is ample scope for many more future research roadmaps: the profile of individual contributors is not analysed, and nor is that of the firms' real contribution; what fragmentation of platforms can be observed on the markets?; to what extent, do the relationships between firms outside the consortia impact the evolution of platforms and stakeholders? This allows us to envisage our future research in two directions. First, thanks to the amount of information provided by the consortia, the network and econometrical analysis could be greatly improved, particularly at the technological level. For instance, we are considering an analysis of the concrete technological modules shared between the consortia:
what standards are spreading among the consortia, and who are their providers? Similarly, multiple membership could be explored by studying the evolution of the relationship between firms other than mobile OS providers. This evolution is also significant in terms of the entry and exit of firms from the consortia: the consortia membership is evolving, and this evolution requires further analyses. The second direction for future research concerns the need to develop a model for agent-based simulation, in order to analyse the various strategies involving mobile OS provision. This paper has attempted to bring to light a complex (horizontal, vertical and hierarchical) strategy, one which is rarely investigated as a whole using agent-based modelling.
